The study finds that while a company may voluntarily use "international" standards, the way harmonisation occurs is consistent with country requirements. There is little use of "international" standards that does not reflect a country's institutional framework. The findings confirm for financial managers the key role of national regulators and standard setters in assisting companies to achieve more comparable international reporting and in supporting harmonisation initiatives promoted by stock exchanges.
I. Introduction
The international convergence of financial accounting standards and practices has emerged as an important issue as companies have become involved in cross-border activities in product and capital markets. Global financial transactions have increased with more companies raising equity outside their home county (Gernon and Meek, 2001, p. 45) . Corporations have expanded through investment in foreign subsidiaries and by sales and production activity in foreign markets (Walton, Haller and Raffournier, 1998, p. 337) . Growth in international business activity has highlighted diversity in financial reporting practices. Each country has a reporting framework that reflects its political, legal, cultural and business environment, which may differ from that of other countries and result in the production of financial information that lacks international comparability. It has been argued that greater comparability in information will enable resources to be allocated more efficiently and better investment decisions to be made. Companies may benefit from reduced accounting costs and a cheaper cost of capital (AARF, 1994) .
Many initiatives have been undertaken at international, national and regional levels by standard setters and regulators to improve the international comparability of reporting.
However the process of changing from financial reporting that is dominated by national rules and practices to an international reporting regime is time consuming and difficult. While companies await further harmonisation developments, they could take action to promote greater comparability in reporting, if the benefits of harmonisation are sufficiently strong.
Voluntary harmonisation with "international" standards is the focus of this paper and the following research questions are investigated. First, to what extent do companies use "international" standards? Second, where "international" standards are used, are IASs or US GAAP 1 chosen? Since not all companies will respond to harmonisation pressures in the same way, the study also asks what are the attributes of companies that use "international" standards, and that choose US GAAP or IASs?
These research questions are important because considerable resources are being devoted to harmonisation by national and international standards setters and regulatory agencies. The study investigates companies' willingness to use "international" rather than national standards. This information is relevant for standard setters as they consider the use of non- national standards, because it demonstrates company support for greater comparability in reporting. "International" standards cannot be adopted in any jurisdiction without support of the companies that will use them, and the regulators who are responsible for their enforcement.
Attributes of companies using "international" standards are considered in this study. The results will inform standard setters of the types of companies for which harmonisation is most important. It may help them determine requirements to assist the companies that can gain the most benefit from common standards.
The study contributes to the literature in the following ways. It shows the extent of use of "international" standards in a range of companies and countries, considering two ways companies can use "international" standards (adoption and supplementary use) and specifically addressing voluntary use of "international" standards. A link between internationality and the use of "international" standards is shown, and how each country's institutional framework impacts on the use of "international" standards is explored. The study investigates the preference for US GAAP or IASs, and reveals explanatory variables for the choice of either. Evidence of the impact of various types of stock exchange listing on the selection of "international" standards, which has not been previously documented, is presented.
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way. The next section describes the institutional environment in the countries included in this study. Section three considers research relevant to the use of "international" standards and section four outlines the development of the hypotheses used to probe the research questions. Section five describes sample selection, data collection and statistical tests. Results are presented in section six and conclusions drawn in the final section.
II. The institutional framework and the use of "international" standards
A company's decision to use "international" accounting standards will be affected by the institutional framework (the body of accounting law, rules and accepted practices as well as the institutions that formulate, administer and enforce these requirements) of its home country. Since institutional frameworks vary between countries, a company's country of origin will impact on its use of "international" standards. In theory, a company could prepare financial statements for the public based on any accounting standards it chose. However in practice cost considerations mean that a company's choice of standards reflects the requirements of the institutional framework of its home country. Five countries (the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Japan and Australia) are included in this study as they illustrate a range of positions in relation to the use of "international" standards, as shown in Table 1 .
Comparison of countries
Scholars have investigated differences between countries and considered factors that may explain them. For example, Radebaugh and Gray (1997, p. 48) suggest there are many environmental influences on accounting regulation, such as legal system, inflation, economic growth and development, social climate, political system, accounting education and research, accounting profession, taxation, finance and capital markets, enterprise activities, enterprise ownership, international factors and culture. Models have been developed to explain country differences using a range of environmental variables (Mueller, 1967; Nobes, 1983; Gray, 1988; Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Nobes and Parker, 1998; Nobes 1998) . Table 2 classifies the five countries included in this study according to various factors that impact on accounting practice to illustrate similarities and differences between the countries.
Between-country reporting differences have been measured in many studies. Researchers considering a range of countries and accounting policies have found considerable international diversity in reporting practices (Emenyonu and Gray, 1992; Herrmann and Thomas, 1995; Emenyonu and Adhikari, 1998) . Therefore, differences in the extent of use of "international" standards between the countries are expected.
Impact of stock exchange requirements
Stock exchange requirements form part of the institutional framework. They could influence the use of "international" standards because they include rules stipulating which accounting standards can be followed by listed firms. The stock exchanges in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Tokyo and Australia accept financial statements prepared according to domestic GAAP and other selected GAAP, including US GAAP. The London, Paris, Frankfurt and Australian exchanges also accept accounts prepared according to IASs (IASC, 2002a) . The stock exchanges of the countries included in this study may require foreign listed firms to provide additional information but they do not require reconciliation to national GAAP as mandated by the US regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Depending on the type of US stock exchange listing, and whether a company plans to raise capital or to trade on the exchange, the SEC requires that a foreign firm prepares US GAAP financial statements or a reconciliation statement from national to US GAAP, the so-called 20F reconciliation (Adhikari, Coffman and Tondkar, 1991; IASC, 2002a) .
Research about companies that list on foreign stock exchanges has found that a stock exchange's reporting requirements influence a company's choice of exchange, with companies being less likely to choose an exchange with greater reporting requirements than the firm's home exchange (Saudagaran and Biddle, 1992, 1995) . Cheung and Lee (1995) investigated a counter argument that some firms will list on an exchange with stricter disclosure requirements because this gives positive signals about the firm's future prospects.
They suggested that the choice of exchange reflects a firm's evaluation of greater listing costs versus pricing benefits. Considering the impact of US stock exchange reporting requirements on disclosure, Botosan and Frost (1998) found that companies in the OTC market made significantly less disclosures than listed companies and did not make voluntary disclosures to match the mandatory disclosures required of US listed companies.
There has been considerable debate about the impact of stock exchange regulations on foreign companies considering listing in the US (see Zeff, 1998) , with the SEC's US GAAP accounting requirements identified as an impediment to a US listing. Choi and Levich (1990) found that many foreign firms did not list in the US but instead raised debt and equity capital in a variety of ways that did not involve meeting US GAAP accounting requirements.
Harmonisation initiatives
The institutional framework in each country has evolved over time, and they have changed in response to demands for greater comparability in reporting. Harmonisation initiatives include the development of IASs by the IASC and international auditing standards by IFAC. 2 The IASC has worked steadily towards its aim of being the global standard setter 3 and has produced a set of standards that are used in many nations throughout the world in the preparation of national standards (IASC, 2002b (IASC, 2000c) . 4 The endorsement carried the proviso that individual countries could request reconciliation adjustments, surely a disappointment to the IASC but predictable when the then position of the SEC is considered.
The SEC has long argued that US GAAP is necessary for investor protection and its attitude to the IASC is influenced accordingly. The SEC has been vocal in its support for US GAAP, arguing that only US GAAP is of sufficient quality to ensure that investors' interests are adequately protected. The SEC claims that US GAAP has served investors well, ensuring markets are provided with the information necessary for efficient operations (Levitt, 1997) .
Only recently (for example, in 1996) has the SEC voiced support for international accounting standards (Hunt, 2000) , perhaps in response to pressure from American businesses and stock markets that are not totally insulated from the forces of globalisation. 
Predicted use of "international" standards
Biddle and Saudaragan (1992) measured financial reporting disclosure levels in major capital markets and reported low levels of disclosure for France (mean disclosure level rank 4), Japan (3) and Germany (2) compared to the US (8) and UK (6). The low levels of disclosure indicate that companies from France, Japan and Germany that seek international investors may act to increase their levels of disclosure. Use of "international" standards is one way to 4 The IASC has worked for several years on its comparability project (E32 Comparability of Financial Statements) to produce a set of comprehensive standards acceptable to IOSCO (the International Organisation of Securities Commissions). 5 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) successfully lobbied US Congress to amend the SEC's governing legislation to require the SEC to enhance its support for high quality international accounting standards (Zeff, 1998) . 6 Dye and Sunder (2001) outlined the arguments for and against allowing the use of IASs in the US.
increase disclosure. 7 Saudaragan (2001, p. 48) 
II. Other factors affecting the use of "international" standards
Studies have identified several influences on the production of financial information in addition to a country's institutional framework. For example, competitive market forces and managerial incentives have been shown to affect the form and content of financial statements.
These factors could affect the use of "international" standards.
Competitive market forces
It has been suggested that firms are motivated to produce financial reports because of the operation of competitive market forces (see Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Firms compete in the capital market with regard to equity or debt instruments offered. Because of uncertainty relating to the quality of these securities, market forces exert pressure on firms to provide information about terms and expected returns on the instruments available. In addition, information asymmetry between buyers and sellers in the capital market means that there is the possibility of being perceived as a "lemon" (Ackerlof, 1970) . Sellers make disclosures to distinguish their product from the "lemons". Thus information is supplied by firms so capital can be raised on more favourable terms. Choi (1973) demonstrated that increased firm disclosure tends to improve the investor's view of a security's expected return by reducing the uncertainty associated with it. Improved disclosure allows the investor to rely more on the firm's information, and the investor is prepared to pay more for the security, resulting in a lower cost of capital for the firm. Botosan (1997) investigated the relationship between disclosure and cost of capital and found that for firms with a low analyst following, greater disclosure was associated with a lower cost of capital.
Competitive market forces could promote the use of "international" standards where firms
consider that an international regime will improve a firm's financial statements and allow it to better communicate with information users. KPMG (2000) reported that European company executives provided many reasons for changing from national standards to IASs or US GAAP including: the possibility of increasing the availability of capital; quality of the standards; preferences of institutional investors; the possibility of lowering the cost of capital; and preferences of analysts. Luez and Verrecchia (2001) investigated whether the use of "international" standards reduces firms' cost of capital. They examined German firms in the Neumarket that changed from national standards to IASs or US GAAP and they found that the behaviour of cost of capital proxies (bid-ask spread and trading volume) indicated that the use of IASs and US GAAP reduced the cost of capital for some German firms.
Firms could use "international" standards to send a signal to capital markets. Applying signalling theory (Spence, 1973) to financial disclosure suggests that managers could use the financial statements to signal their expectations and intentions (Hunt, 1986) . The use of "international" standards could signal to market participants that the firm is prepared to disclose more information, or to use more restrictive accounting standards. Ashbaugh (2001) suggested that firms used "international" standards to communicate with foreign financial information users, to facilitate the raising of equity capital and to provide more standardised financial information in the annual financial report. Considering foreign firms listed on the London Stock Exchange she found that firms that used "international" standards traded in more foreign equity markets, issued more equity, provided more standardised information and were more likely to file Form 20F information than firms that used national standards. A survey by KPMG (2000) found that 34 out of 122 European companies were contemplating changing from non-national standards during the next three to five years, and that 56% planned to adopt IASs while 29% were considering US GAAP.
Managerial incentives
Considerable research has examined the role of managerial incentives in the production of financial information (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) . Agency theory has been used to understand the incentives for disclosure, and to predict the relationship between firm attributes and disclosure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that disclosure arises from the nature of the contractual relationship between the principals (shareholders and debtholders) and their agents (the managers). Disclosure is used to reduce the information asymmetry that exists between the agents (being managers and therefore insiders) and the principals (who are outside the firm and are less informed) about the future prospects of the firm and about the managers' consumption of perquisites.
Since the use of "international" standards may mean that a firm makes more disclosure, the propositions of agency theory can be used to predict the relationship of firm attributes and the use of "international" standards. Attributes of particular interest in the present study are those related to the internationality of the firm, such as foreign revenue and foreign listing. Foreign revenue has been linked with disclosure of financial information by Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) and Zarzeski (1996) , and with Swiss firms' use of IASs by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) . Foreign listing was associated with more disclosure in many studies (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989 Cooke, , 1991 Firth, 1979; Malone, Fries and Jones, 1993; Hossain and Adams, 1995; Mitchell, Chia and Loh, 1995; Meek et al., 1995) .
Other firm attributes considered in the present study are size, leverage and industry. Size has been consistently found to be related to more disclosure. 9 Larger companies are more likely to be more international and therefore to make greater use of "international" standards.
Leverage is used in this study as a proxy to capture the firm's dependence on equity capital.
Firms with higher leverage are relatively less dependent on equity capital, and are therefore less likely to be subject to shareholders' demands for information and to use disclosure to reduce information asymmetry with shareholders. Some studies find that disclosure practices vary between industries (McNally, Eng and Hasseldene, 1982; Cooke, 1991; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1979; Mitchell et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995) . Therefore industry classification is considered in this study.
IV. The use of "international" standards and the choice of US GAAP or IASs
It is expected that international companies are more interested in "international" accounting standards than other companies because of their involvement in product and capital markets outside national boundaries. International firms (those with foreign revenue or foreign stock exchange listings) may want to communicate financial information to interested parties, using an internationally recognised accounting language. Firms may select "international" standards to increase transparency in reporting and reduce restatement of financial information.
Two categories of use of "international" standards are distinguished in this study: adoption and supplementary use. Companies that adopt "international" standards are those that provide for the public financial statements based on "international" standards rather than national ones. Companies that make supplementary use of "international" standards are those that use national standards in preparing their financial statements but in addition to national standards they refer to "international" standards in some way in the accounts presented to the public.
For example, a company could provide a second set of financial statements based on nonnational GAAP, a reconciliation statement from national to non-national GAAP, or use a specific "international" standard because there is no national standard that addresses the matter.
There are two sets of accounting standards that could have the title of "international", namely
IASs and US GAAP. The IASC has issued the only comprehensive set of "international" standards, so for companies seeking "international" standards IASs are an obvious choice.
However, US GAAP are also used by foreign listed firms because of SEC accounting requirements. Therefore in a multi-country sample of companies with a range of foreign listings, the "international" standards selected may be either IASs or US GAAP. standards are expected to use US GAAP to achieve comparability with other companies in the US market. However, these companies are not subject to the SEC's US GAAP accounting requirements so their incentives to use US GAAP are not as strong as for NYSE foreign listed firms. Companies with non-US foreign listings are not traded in the US and therefore US GAAP accounting requirements do not apply to them. In fact, they may have chosen a non-US foreign listing to avoid US GAAP reconciliation (Choi and Levich, 1990) . If that is the case, then selection of US GAAP is not expected. US GAAP are considered the most onerous reporting standards (Saudagaran, 2001, p. 18 
V. Data collection and sample design
Companies from five countries (the UK, Australia, Germany, France and Japan) were selected to reflect various institutional positions in relation to the use of IASs and US GAAP. An
English language annual report the 1999-2000 financial year was requested from the largest 150 companies (by market capitalisation) in each country based on the Datastream (2000) database.
Companies not included in the largest 150 but named on foreign company lists obtained from stock exchanges in the five countries were also contacted. In most foreign listing categories, all the annual reports received were included, except where more than 30
reports were received when a random selection of the reports received was made. Therefore the foreign listed companies included in the sample are all those for which a report was received to a maximum of 30 companies in any one country category. A random selection (by country) of reports of companies with only a domestic listing was made from all the reports received so that the number of domestic-only listed companies was the same as the number of foreign listed companies for each country. The total number of companies in each country's sample varies because each country has a different number of foreign listed companies. Table 3 shows the number of sample companies as a proportion of the population of listed companies for each country and stock exchange listing category.
Each company's use of standards was recorded as national or "international"according to information in its financial statements. Then users of "international" standards were classified as adopters or supplementary users. For all users of "international" standards, and then for the adopters and the supplementary users, the choice of IASs or US GAAP was recorded. Five binary logistical regression equations examined the relationship between these choices and independent variables representing firm attributes. The regression equations form a nested relationship, which is shown in Figure 1 . The independent variables, listed in Table 4, include proportion of foreign revenue, size and leverage. Dummy variables for stock exchange listing, industry and country are also included. Predictions of the relationships between the dependent and independent variables are provided in Table 4 .
Descriptive statistics for the continuous variables are shown in Table 5 . The proportion of foreign revenue ranges from 0 to 100% for the whole sample and the mean foreign revenue is 31.80%. It is highest in France (49.76%) and Germany (44.85%), moderate in the UK (35.46%) and low in Japan (16.13%) and Australia (17.96%). Japanese firms are the largest in the sample (mean 4.04) followed by companies from the UK (3.52), Germany (3.02), Australia (2.84) and France (2.75). Mean leverage ranges from 0 to 100%. The figure of 100% for leverage implies that the firm has negligible equity. Such a result occurs because the market value rather than the book value of equity is used. 10 German firms have the highest mean leverage (64.89%) followed by France (56.85%), Japan (48.71%), the UK (39.27%) and Australia (38.36%).
Pearson product moment correlations reported in Table 6 show a significant negative correlation between size and leverage (-0.149) indicating that the larger firms are less highly geared. The smaller firms could be firms with expansion plans that make greater use of leverage to facilitate their growth. The negative correlation also reflects the use of market capitalisation as the size measure and in the denominator of the leverage measure.
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VI. Empirical Results
Use of "international" standards
The study finds that "international" standards are used by 35% of companies, including firms from all five countries and each category of stock exchange listing ( Table 9 reconciles the number of companies included in Tables 7 and 8 (frequency of use and choice of standards) and the number of companies in each regression equation (Tables 10 -13) . 13 Use of "international" standards by domestic-only listed firms could also reflect future foreign stock exchange listing plans, however these are unrevealed at the present time.
Larger firms are more likely to use "international" standards (SIZE is significant, p < 0.05, Table 10 ). Leverage and industry group are not significant explanatory variables for the use of "international" standards. The lack of significance of industry variables may indicate that harmonisation of reporting (through the use of "international" standards) is equally important for all industry groups. The model is significant (x 2 = 213.57, p < 0.000) and has a Nagelkerke R 2 of 0.499. It classifies 80.0% of cases correctly (based on a 50% cut-off, Table   10 ). Although the overall model is significant, the R 2 indicates that there are other explanatory variables for the use of "international" standards not included in the model.
As predicted, there is more use of "international" standards in Germany (65%), France (40%) and Japan (37%) than in the UK (25%) and Australia (15%) ( Table 7 , Regression 1).
(GERMANY, FRANCE and JAPAN are significantly different from AUST, p < 0.05, Table   10 ). Many German firms use the option available to them under the German Commercial
Code to present financial information in accordance with "international" standards rather than national GAAP reflecting considerable voluntary support for more international comparability in reporting. The level of use of "international" standards is not as high in France as it is in Germany, which may result from economic and institutional differences between the countries. Legal support for the use of "international" standards in France was not finalised.
14 NYSE is significant in all individual country regressions (p < 0.05, Table 10 ) demonstrating the impact of SEC requirements across countries. OTC is significant in individual regressions for Germany, France, Japan (p < 0.05) and Australia (p < 0.10 , Table 10 ) showing that voluntary use of "international" standards occurs across countries with institutional differences. In the UK, OTC is not significant indicating less voluntary use of "international" standards in the UK compared with the other countries. UK companies in the OTC category may not perceive a need to use "international" standards, because of existing international recognition of UK GAAP.
Considering the individual country regressions, FORREV is significant only in the UK (p < 0.05, Table 10 ). Differences in level of foreign revenue between the countries do not explain this result, as mean foreign revenue of 35.46% in the UK is lower than that in France and Germany, and higher than Australia and Japan (Table 5) . SIZE is significant only in Japan (p < 0.05 , Table 10 ), the country with the largest companies (mean size 4.04, Table 5 ). There 14 A law allowing the use of IASs in consolidated reports had been passed in April 1998, but it had not been approved for use at the date of the study (IASC, 2002c) . are significant differences between industry groups only in Germany. 15 LEVERAGE has mixed results in the individual country regressions. It is significant in the predicted direction in Germany (p < 0.05) and the UK (p < 0.10, Table 10 ), but not in Japan and Australia.
Companies in Germany have high mean leverage, in Japan medium and in the UK and Australia low mean leverage (Table 5) . Therefore, different levels of leverage do not explain the result. Alternative interpretations of the relationship of leverage and the use of "international" standards to the one initially proposed in this study should be considered. For example, firms with higher leverage might intend to obtain more equity finance than debt in the future, therefore "international" standards are used because of plans to attract more investors.
Use of "international" standards -adoption or supplementary use
The use of "international" standards is further explored by dividing the companies that adopt "international" standards from those that make supplementary use of them. Table 7 (Regression 2) shows that among firms that use "international" standards, 49% adopt and 51% make supplementary use of them. Adoption of "international" standards is associated with FORREV and NYSE, and supplementary use is associated with SIZE and IND1 (p < 0.05, Table 11 ). SEC requirements appear to promote the adoption (as distinct from supplementary use) of "international" standards. OTC and NON-US are not associated with either adoption or supplementary use (Table 11 ). The model is significant (x 2 = 135.664, p < 0.000) with a Nagelkerke R 2 of 0.745. It correctly classifies 86.7% of cases (based on 50% cut-off).
The pattern of adoption and supplementary use in each country reflects the institutional requirements governing financial reporting. Firms from Germany and Japan are more likely to adopt "international" standards than other firms (GERMANY and JAPAN are significantly different from AUST, p < 0.005, Table 11 ). In Germany, most firms that use "international" standards adopt rather than make supplementary use of them (88% compared to 12%, Table 7 , Regression 2). The country regression for Germany provides no explanatory variables for adoption of "international" standards. It indicates that larger firms and those from Industry 1 (resources and utilities) are more likely to make supplementary use than adopt "international" standards (SIZE and IND1 are negative and significant, p < 0.05, Table 11 ). For Japanese 15 Firms from IND2 and IND3 are more likely to use "international" standards than those from IND4 (Table 9) . A possible explanation for this result is that the firms in IND4 are a more mixed group than those in IND2 and IND3. The diverse range of industries represented by IND4 firms may mean that an industry trend for the use of "international" standards is not observed.
firms, adoption is associated with more foreign revenue (FORREV is significant, p < 0.10, Table 11 ). The majority of French firms using "international" standards make supplementary use of them (82%, Regression 2). It would appear that requirements to lodge national GAAP accounts with regulators means that these are the financial statements usually provided to the public.
Use of "international" standards -choice of US GAAP or IASs
Most companies using "international" standards choose US GAAP (64%, choose US GAAP, reflecting SEC requirements. OTC is not significant, so H3 is not supported for these firms (Table 12 ). The result indicates that despite their presence in the US OTC market, some firms do not choose US GAAP as their "international" standards. It implies that there are costs incurred by the use of US GAAP, or conversely there is something about IASs that makes them preferable to US GAAP, and it is more important than achieving comparability with other firms using US GAAP. NON-US is not significant so H4 is not supported. Non-US foreign listing is not associated with choice of either US GAAP or IASs (Table 12 ). Arguments that IASs is a more attractive regime than US GAAP for these companies are not supported by the evidence.
German firms make greater use of IASs than firms in other countries (GERMANY is significant in the full sample, p < 0.05, Table 12 ). Table 7 (Regression 3) shows that 62% of firms choose IASs and 38% US GAAP indicating an overall preference for IASs in Germany.
More foreign revenue is associated with use of IASs (FORREV is significant, p < 0.10, Table   12 ). NYSE foreign listing is associated with the use of US GAAP (NYSE significant p < 0.05, Table 12 ).
The individual country regression for France has no significant variables ( Among Japanese companies 73% use US GAAP and 27% use IASs (Table 7 , Regression 3).
The country regression shows that the use of US GAAP is associated with FORREV (significant at p < 0.10, Table 12 ) and the use of IASs is associated with IND3 (banking, finance and insurance firms) (p < 0.10, Table 12 ). Some firms from this industry sector have chosen to voluntarily refer to IASs, which could reflect an attempt to improve the quality of their reporting. 16 Table 7 shows that among UK firms 86% use US GAAP, 7% use IASs and 7% use other GAAP (Australian GAAP and Hong Kong GAAP). Since UK GAAP has many requirements in common with IASs, firms may not perceive any benefit in using IASs. For the Australian firms, Table 7 (Regression 3) shows that 81% of firms use US GAAP, 6% use
IASs and 13% are classified as other (one company uses both US GAAP and IASs, and one company uses UK GAAP). There may be little use of IASs because Australian standards have been largely harmonised with IASs and firms view further reference to IASs as unnecessary.
Choice of US GAAP or IASs by companies that adopt "international" standards
US GAAP is used by 62% of companies adopting "international" standards, while 38%
choose IASs (Table 7 , Regression 4). NYSE is associated with the choice of US GAAP (p < 0.05, Table 13 ). 17 SIZE is associated with the choice of IASs (p < 0.10, Table 13 ). The model is significant (x 2 = 74.106, p < 0.000) and has a Nagelkerke R 2 of 0.817. It classifies 93.8% of cases correctly (based on a 50% cut-off, Table 13 ). Since most adopting firms are from Germany, the results for the full sample are mirrored in the individual country regression for Germany (Table 13) .
Choice of US GAAP or IASs by supplementary users of "international" standards
Most companies making supplementary use of "international" standards select US GAAP (68%, Table 7 , Regression 5), while 22% choose IASs and 10% use other national standards or both US GAAP or IASs. The model is significant (x 2 = 41.435, p < 0.000) and has a Nagelkerke R 2 of 0.577. It classifies 86.6% of cases correctly (based on a 50% cut-off, Table   13 ). However it provides no explanatory variables for the choice of US GAAP. The choice of IASs is associated with FORREV (p < 0.05, Table 13 ). None of the foreign listing variables are significant in the predicted direction. The choice of US GAAP or IASs by NYSE and non-US foreign listed firms is not significantly different from the choice made by firms in the domestic-only listed group. OTC is associated with the supplementary use of IASs, not with US GAAP as predicted. The results show a preference for IASs among some OTC firms. The implication is that some OTC companies voluntarily use "international" standards, with some firms selected US GAAP and others IASs. Some firms make supplementary use of IASs rather than US GAAP, despite their presence in the US market.
VII. Conclusions
The study asks "To what extent do companies use "international" accounting standards?" It finds some voluntary use of non-national standards across five countries, despite their differences in institutional requirements. The results provide empirical evidence of companies' support for "international" standards and a link between firms' level of internationality and their use of "international" standards. The users of "international" standards are predominantly larger firms with foreign stock exchange listings and a greater proportion of foreign revenue.
In relation to the choice between US GAAP and IASs, selection of US GAAP dominates although there is strong support for IASs in Germany and among OTC and domestic-only listed firms. Companies' choice of US GAAP or IASs reflects country requirements that dictate the extent and direction of harmonisation with "international" standards. While the decision to use "international" standards may be made voluntarily by companies and could reflect the impact of market pressures demanding more comparable reporting, the way harmonisation is pursued through the use of "international" standards is greatly influenced by individual country requirements. The findings illustrate that companies' ability to increase comparability in reporting is considerably constrained or assisted by individual country requirements. There is little use of "international" standards that is inconsistent with each country's institutional framework.
The impact of stock exchange listing on choice is illustrated by the results. As expected, companies listed in the US are more likely to choose US GAAP over IASs. However, the absence of mandatory US GAAP accounting requirements for OTC companies allows them greater choice, which some firms exercised in favour of IASs rather than US GAAP. Being traded on the US OTC market does not necessarily mean preference for US GAAP when "international" standards are used.
The evidence about firms' use of "international" standards provides support for regulators and standard setters in their pursuit of greater harmonisation in reporting requirements at an international level. The impact of individual country requirements on the use of "international" standards indicates that national regulators have a key role to play in assisting companies that wish to pursue greater harmonisation. Companies seeking the benefits of greater harmonisation in reporting will need to continue to lobby standard setters and regulators for rules that assist them to do so. While foreign listed companies could find IOSCO harmonisation initiatives helpful, greater benefit can be gained if national regulations also support "international" standards. Standards setters may be interested in the finding that domestic-only listed as well as foreign firms use "international" standards, indicating greater support for "international" standards than may have been expected. (Nobes, 1983) Commercially driven Government driven, tax dominated Culture (Gray,1988) Similar accounting values (professionalism/statutory control; uniformity/flexibility; conservatism/optimism; secrecy/transparency)
Similar accounting values (professionalism/statutory control; uniformity/flexibility; conservatism/optimism; secrecy/transparency) Legal system (Doupnik and Salter, 1995) Derived from common law Code law based
International resource dependence (Zarzeski, 1996) Companies vary in the extent of their international resource dependence
Companies vary in the extent of their international resource dependence Focus of accounting (Nobes and Parker, 1998) Strong equity Weak equity Source of finance (Nobes, 1998) Many outsider firms -source of capital is public equity and debt
Many insider firms -source of capital is private equity and debt Corporate governance (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000) Shareholder model Stakeholder model 92 100 (a) Other = both US GAAP and IASs, other national standards (such as UK GAAP, Australian GAAP, Hong Kong GAAP) or reference to "international" without specifying US GAAP or IASs. Use = "international" standards = adoption and supplementary use. Adoption = use of "international" standards in financial statements provided to the public. Supplementary use = national standards and some "international" standards used in financial statements provided to the public. 3 7 2 8 0 0 4 22 9 10 TOTAL 43 100 25 100 6 100 18 100 92 100 (a) Other = both US GAAP and IASs, other national standards (such as UK GAAP, Australian GAAP, HK GAAP) or reference to "international" without specifying US GAAP or IASs. Use = "international" standards = adoption and supplementary use. Adoption = use of "international" standards in financial statements provided to the public. Supplementary use = national standards and some "international" standards used in financial statements provided to the public. Table 9 Number of companies in frequency tables and regression models one-tailed) significant at p < 0.05. * Wald test (two-tailed) significant at p < 0.10. NA = not applicable. (a) Significant but wrong sign. ADOPT: Individual country regressions are not calculated where all firms use US GAAP (UK: 2 out of 2; France: 7 out of 7: Japan 24 out of 24; Australia 1 out of 1, see Table 7 ). SUPPLEMENTARY USE: Individual country regressions not calculated where most companies use US GAAP (UK: 22 out of 26; Germany: 5 out of 7; Australia 12 out of 15) or IASs (Japan: 10 out of 13), see Table  7 .
